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A B S T R A C T
Governments have implemented social distancing measures to address the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The
measures include instructions that individuals maintain social distance when in public, school closures, lim-
itations on gatherings and business operations, and instructions to remain at home. Social distancing may have
an impact on the volume and distribution of crime. Crimes such as residential burglary may decrease as a
byproduct of increased guardianship over personal space and property. Crimes such as domestic violence may
increase because of extended periods of contact between potential offenders and victims. Understanding the
impact of social distancing on crime is critical for ensuring the safety of police and government capacity to deal
with the evolving crisis. Understanding how social distancing policies impact crime may also provide insights
into whether people are complying with public health measures. Examination of the most recently available data
from both Los Angeles, CA, and Indianapolis, IN, shows that social distancing has had a statistically significant
impact on a few specific crime types. However, the overall effect is notably less than might be expected given the
scale of the disruption to social and economic life.
1. Introduction
In response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, governments
across the United States have implemented social distancing regulations
with varying degrees of stringency. Social distancing is a long-estab-
lished public health tool, which seeks to reduce opportunities for an
infectious agent to spread among individuals and to reduce the overall
speed of transmission (Caley, Philp, & McCracken, 2008; Hatchett,
Mecher, & Lipsitch, 2007). Social distancing measures include instruc-
tions that individuals maintain a distance from one another when in
public, limitations on gatherings, limitations on the operation of busi-
nesses, and instructions to remain at home. Rapid implementation of
comprehensive social distancing is particularly important the more
infectious the disease (Bootsma & Ferguson, 2007; Kelso, Milne, &
Kelly, 2009).
Individuals, however, may prove resistant to social distancing or-
ders. Because the benefits of social distancing accrue to the community
at large, individuals have weak incentives to pay the costs (including
economic strain, inconveniences to everyday life, and emotional effects
among others) themselves (Reluga, 2010). In addition, individuals are
typically bad at estimating the risks of disease transmission (Cho, Lee, &
Lee, 2013), and may be influenced by mixed messaging emanating from
different levels of government and misleading information from various
media sources (Sha, Al Hasan, Mohler, & Brantingham, 2020). In a
notable public display of these tendencies, California residents con-
gregated on beaches over the weekend of March 21–22, 2020, despite
the state's comprehensive "shelter in place" order (Reyes-Velarde, Vives,
& Newberry, 2020).
Where fully implemented, social distancing measures create a
variety of secondary impacts beyond the disruption of disease trans-
mission. Importantly, there are strong reasons to expect that social
distancing will alter both the volume and distribution of crime and
disorder. This expectation flows from two fundamental principles of
crime pattern formation (Cohen & Felson, 1979). First, crimes can only
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occur where motivated offenders encounter suitable targets in the ab-
sence of capable guardians that would otherwise disrupt the crime.
Second, people going about their normal daily routines are sufficient to
generate the physical conditions for most crime incidents. Social dis-
tancing measures on the scale presently being imposed throughout
much of the United States should drive a massive disruption of daily
routines, significantly altering and disrupting the material conditions
under which crime may occur.
Under an effective social distancing regime, we expect that 1) the
impact on crime will be significant and 2) that the nature of the impact
will vary by the type of crime. Residential burglars, for instance, rely on
homes being empty during the day while individuals are at work or
school (Nee & Taylor, 2000). As a result, a large-scale shelter in place
order should remove most residential targets from consideration. Re-
sidential burglary should fall precipitously under these conditions. The
same order, however, could increase the volume of domestic or in-
timate partner violence, which thrives behind closed doors. Potential
victims and offenders are limited in their ability to separate, while
coping with burdens of social distancing on daily lives may generate
additional stress among family and partners (DeLuca, Coleman,
Papageorge, Mitchell, & Kalish, 2020).
Crime patterns may also provide valuable insights into whether
individuals and communities are meaningfully complying with critical
public health measures. Wide-spread non-compliance, for instance, may
result in crime patterns that remain stable despite changes in govern-
ment policy.
Law enforcement may be pulled in different directions based on
how crime patterns are impacted by social distancing measures. While a
reduction in residential burglaries may free up time, an increase in
other crimes may rapidly fill that void. If the crimes that increase under
social distancing are more challenging to deal with and more harmful,
then the response capacity of police departments and local governments
may be compromised. Stable patterns of crime despite the imposition of
new measures, meanwhile, may suggest the need to devote resources
towards the enforcement of social distancing. Understanding how crime
patterns are being impacted by new measures, as a result, is critical to
managing the current crisis and planning for the future.
Here we examine patterns in police calls-for-service and reported
crime over the course of the unfolding pandemic. We contrast Los
Angeles, CA, where state-wide and local shelter in place orders were
implemented starting March 20, 2020, and Indianapolis, IN, where such
an order was put in place effective March 24, 2020. School, restaurant
and bar closures were ordered in both Los Angeles and Indianapolis as
of March 16, 2020.
2. Methods
We analyze daily counts of calls for service in Los Angeles from
January 2, 2020 to April 18, 2020 and in Indianapolis, Indiana from
January 2, 2020 through April 21, 2020. We test for differences in
means from a baseline period, defined to be the time period prior to
school, restaurant and bar closings (January 2 to March 16, 2020). The
treatment time period is defined to be after shelter in place orders were
given: March 20, 2020 to April 18, 2020 in Los Angeles, and March 24,
2020 to April 21, 2020 in Indianapolis. In our first analysis we exclude
the time period between school closings and shelter in place (March 16
to March 20 in Los Angeles, March 16 to March 24 in Indianapolis) in
order to compare full social distancing effects (post stay-at-home or-
ders) to a baseline with no social distancing measures yet implemented.
To test for a difference in means we run regressions for each in-
cident type i of the form,
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Here yti is the number of calls for service of type i on day t and
1{t > tsh} is an indicator for the treatment period after the shleter in
place order. We control for seasonal effects in the regression, letting
1{dw(1) = j} be an indicator variable for the day of the week dw(t) = j
and 1{wm(t) = k} be an indicator variable for week of the month, wm
(t) = k.
Because adherence to shelter in place orders may be delayed and/or
vary by location and date, we also run a second regression using daily
Google residential mobility indices (Google, 2020) of the form,
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Here xt is the Google residential mobility index on day t and gi is the
coefficient of the mobility index for crime category i. The Google mo-
bility indices are defined at the county level and are based on anon-
ymized cell phone location history, normalized by a baseline level of
activity. While other mobility index types are available (see Fig. 4),
they are highly correlated with residential mobility. Reports are pub-
lished in PDF-form by Google, which are then parsed using an open
source python tool (PDF Reader, 2020). We present these results in the
Discussion as a cross-check for our main analyses.
We apply the same regression methodologies to verified crime re-
ports from Los Angeles and Indianapolis. We shorten the observation
period to January 2, 2020 - April 10, 2020 in Los Angeles and January
2, 2020 - April 18, 2020 in Indianapolis to account for reporting lag in
the last three days of each dataset.
3. Results
In Fig. 1 we display trends in the volume of calls-for-service from
January 2, 2020 to April 21, 2020 and in Table 1 we include p-values
for a change in means across the two time periods (pre- school closings
and post- stay at home orders). Social distancing should increase
guardianship of residential properties, and remove people from public
settings where they are more vulnerable to certain violent crimes.
Burglary calls were statistically lower in Los Angeles after shelter in
place, even with a conservative adjustment for comparisons of m = 12
different calls-for-service models (i.e., = =α α m/ 0.00420.05 ) (Bland &
Altman, 1995). Burglary calls were lower in Indianapolis after the stay
at home order, but the change is not statistically significant. Robbery
calls were significantly down in Los Angeles, but only marginally so in
Indianapolis when accounting for multiple comparisons. Assault/bat-
tery calls were statistically unchanged in both locations.
Domestic violence, on the other hand, is expected to increase fol-
lowing social distancing due to increased opportunity for conflict in the
home. Both Los Angeles and Indianapolis saw significant increases in
domestic violence calls (Fig. 1, Table 1).
Finally, we analyze event call categories for which the impact of
social distancing is ambiguous from the perspective of routine activities
theory. Social distancing and shelter in place may increase local guar-
dianship near the home, but also change the distribution of targets in
ways that encourage offending. Here we found that calls related to
vehicle theft were marginally higher in Los Angeles, but were un-
changed in Indianapolis (Fig. 1, Table 1). Vandalism calls moved in
opposite directions in Los Angeles (lower) and Indianapolis (higher),
but neither outcome was significant after correcting for multiple model
comparisons.
Traffic stops are a type of officer-initiated call. In Indianapolis traffic
stops were significantly down after school closings and remained lower
after shelter in place (Fig. 2). Traffic stops were also significantly lower
in Los Angeles following the stay at home order. Reduced traffic stops
could be partially explained by the overall reduction in traffic flow due
to people complying with shelter in place orders. In Indianapolis, patrol
officers were also instructed to exercise discretion in conducting traffic
stops to mitigate less than necessary social contact. In Los Angeles, no
such directive was issued, but individual discretionary choice by offi-
cers may be at play.
Comparable patterns were also observed for reported crime (Fig. 3,
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Table 2). Reported crime derives predominantly from calls to the police
by the public (Klinger & Bridges, 1997), but includes some amount of
investigative validation by officers in the field. Reported burglary was
statistically unchanged in Los Angeles and Indianapolis after shelter in
place, when adjusting for comparison among multiple models (i.e.,
= =α α /8 0.006250.05 ) (Table 2). Reported robbery was significantly
down in Los Angeles, but not in Indianapolis. Reported aggravated
assault was statistically unchanged in both Los Angeles and In-
dianapolis after shelter in place. Domestic violence makes up a portion
of the reported aggravated assaults, but we are unable to distinguish
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Fig. 1. Time series of calls for service per day (black) along with mean calls per day (red line) over each of the three time periods. Blue vertical line indicates the date
schools, restaurants and bars closed and green vertical line indicates the date of the shelter in place order. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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these events in the reported crime data. However, we note that the
significant increases in domestic violence calls-for-service were not
enough to drive changes in reported aggravated assaults overall. Re-
ported vehicle thefts were significantly higher in Los Angeles, but un-
changed in Indianapolis.
4. Discussion
Our results suggest that social distancing and shelter in place has
had some impact on crime and disorder, but only for a restricted col-
lection of crime types and not consistently across places. A recent study
(Campedelli, Aziani, & Favarin, 2020) found crime rates to be mar-
ginally lower in Los Angeles. Burglary does show some signs of being
down, but primarily based on lower calls-for-service in Los Angeles.
Robbery calls and reported crimes were also down in Los Angeles.
Vehicle crimes show some signs of being up, but again primarily based
on calls-for-service in Los Angeles. The most robust patterns to emerge,
in both Los Angeles and Indianapolis, were a substantial decrease in
traffic stops and a substantial increase in domestic violence calls-for-
service. However, the increase in domestic violence calls did not appear
to seriously impact reported aggravated assaults. We note that not all
domestic violence calls are assaults involving aggravating circum-
stances. Many such calls prove to be domestic disturbances without
violence (MacDonald, Manz, Alpert, & Dunham, 2003). This finding
also has implications for officer safety. Incidents of domestic violence
present one of the riskiest incidents for officer injury (Johnson, 2008,
2011) and also use of force (MacDonald et al., 2003). Thus, agencies
should consider mechanisms to reinforce training of how to effectively
and safely respond to domestic violence calls for service in light of
social distancing.
The marginal decline in residential burglaries, marginal increase in
auto thefts, and increase in domestic violence calls, points to shifts in
crime patterns to which police departments will necessarily have to
respond. These shifts, however, are perhaps less substantial than might
be expected from the wholesale disruption of social and economic life
brought on by COVID-19. Despite the imposition of broad social dis-
tancing regulations, our findings suggest that the routines of daily life
that help to generate crime remain unchanged in most ways. Social
distancing policies have had an important, but less than complete,
impact on day-to-day life.
This conclusion is reinforced when we examine calls-for-service and
reported crime volume against Google mobility data. Fig. 4 shows ac-
tivity distributions derived from device location information and
known or inferred location types. In Los Angeles and Indianapolis,
routine activities begin to change approximately 8–10 days before
shelter in place orders. The data show a definite shift towards activity
concentrated in and around people's homes. Burglary and vandalism
calls were significantly lower in Los Angeles as a function of the shift in
activity to the home, taking into account multiple model comparisons
(Table 3). Vehicle theft calls increased significantly in Los Angeles.
Domestic violence calls increased significantly as a function of the ac-
tivity shift in both Los Angeles and Indianapolis. The results for re-
ported crime are very similar. Burglary and robbery events were down
and vehicle thefts up in Los Angeles, while the effects on aggravated
Table 1
Regression of daily calls for service rate against stay-at-home order indicator
controlling for day of the week and week of the month effects.
Type City Intercept c1i1{t > tsh} st. err. p-val
Burglary Los Angeles 101.9604 −19.2569↓ 2.6645 <0.0001⁎
Burglary Indianapolis 20.3382 −2.4129 1.3392 0.0749
Robbery Los Angeles 37.8371 −4.9570↓ 1.4449 0.0009⁎
Robbery Indianapolis 5.9317 −2.0013↓ 0.7333 0.0076
Assault-
battery
Los Angeles 189.2834 −2.5879 3.7693 0.4941
Assault-
battery
Indianapolis 10.1304 −0.0026 0.6651 0.9969
Vehicle theft Los Angeles 29.4776 4.4446↑ 1.5796 0.0060
Vehicle theft Indianapolis 18.6877 0.3703 1.0921 0.7354
Domestic
violence
Los Angeles 114.5681 13.1684↑ 2.7466 <0.0001⁎
Domestic
violence
Indianapolis 87.4505 13.7113↑ 2.3046 <0.0001⁎
Vandalism Los Angeles 51.3657 −2.9531 1.6179 0.0712
Vandalism Indianapolis 23.0774 2.7723 1.4629 0.0613
Traffic stops Los Angeles 326.356 190.8056↓ 18.1511 <0.0001⁎
Traffic stops Indianapolis 252.7118 231.1052↓ 12.6032 <0.0001⁎
Significant results prior to Bonferroni correction are indicated with boldface.
⁎ Significant after conservative Bonferroni correction with critical value
=α 0.0042.
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Fig. 2. Time series of traffic stops per day (black)
along with mean calls per day (red line) over each of
the three time periods. Blue vertical line indicates
the date schools, restaurants and bars closed and
green vertical line indicates the date of the shelter in
place order. (For interpretation of the references to
colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to
the web version of this article.)
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assaults were in opposite directions (Table 4). However, as many call
and crime categories were not significantly altered as a function of the
shift in routine activities. This is particularly true in Indianapolis, but
also for certain crime types in Los Angles. It is worth noting that the
practical differences in volume of calls per day are quite small. With the
exception of burglary calls in Los Angeles (Δy = -19.27) and domestic
violence calls in both Los Angeles and Indianapolis (Δy = 13.55 and
Δy = 15.22, respectively), no other call or crime type experienced a
change in volume of more than 8.8 events per day. In cities the size of
Los Angeles (≈4 mil) and Indianapolis (≈0.8 mil), these are small
differences in day-to-day crime and disorder. Overall, in spite of ap-
parent changes to routine activities, people were still finding opportu-
nities to commit crimes at approximately the same level as before the
crisis.
Moving forward, calls-for-service and crime numbers can be com-
pared with local data on new infections. Where individuals and com-
munities avoid complying with existing social distancing measures,
governments may consider alternative approaches. In some instances,
police departments may find themselves engaged in more direct en-
forcement of limitations on social and economic activity. Meanwhile, as
some jurisdictions consider relaxing social distancing measures, police
departments may again face a changing crime environment.
Finally, we note several limitations of the present study. First, the
results presented here are specific to Los Angeles and Indianapolis and
may not generalize to other cities in the U.S. Second, though calls for
service remain relatively stable during pre- and post-social distancing
temporal periods examined here, we are not able to determine if social
distancing influences whether individuals are more or less likely to
report incidents of crime. However, despite domestic violence having
been one of the crimes least reported to the police, with approximately
half of all domestic victimization being unreported (Reaves, 2017), our
results indicate that calls concerning domestic violence significantly
increased in both Indianapolis and Los Angeles. Furthermore, police
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Fig. 3. Time series of verified crime reports per day (black) along with mean calls per day (red line) over each of the three time periods. Blue vertical line indicates
the date schools, restaurants and bars closed and green vertical line indicates the date of the shelter in place order. (For interpretation of the references to colour in
this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 2
Regression of verified crime report rate against stay-at-home order indicator
controlling for day of the week and week of the month effects
Type City Intercept c1i1{t > tsh} st. err. p-val
Burglary Los Angeles 31.3575 −3.8629↓ 1.6233 0.0196
Burglary Indianapolis 8.5156 −2.0902↓ 0.8204 0.0126
Robbery Los Angeles 24.2496 −6.2263↓ 1.3106 <0.0001⁎
Robbery Indianapolis 5.1276 −1.165 0.6174 0.0626
Agg. Assault Los Angeles 40.5362 −4.2857↓ 1.826 0.0213
Agg. Assault Indianapolis 4.5379 0.9548 0.5051 0.0622
Vehicle theft Los Angeles 46.798 6.4768↑ 1.9476 0.0013⁎
Vehicle theft Indianapolis 11.039 −0.6564 0.8536 0.4440
⁎ Significant after conservative Bonferroni correction with critical value
=α 0.00625.
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departments across the country have undertaken both innovative and
dramatic changes to reinforce available patrol resources in response to
crime. Officers who contract COVID-19, had traveled leading up to the
social distancing time period, or must accommodate children home
from school, generate a reduced workforce for agencies. For example,
the Police Executive Research Forum provides daily updates on its
website that highlight contingency plans from agencies across the
country. These strategies range from having officers work single-vehicle
patrols and modified shift assignments, to reassigning detectives and
investigative personnel to patrol duties. Specific to the locations of
study, informal discussions between the authors, Los Angeles, and In-
dianapolis police departments suggests both agencies are responding to
calls for service at levels consistent to pre-social distancing. In sum, we
do not believe that possible under-reporting of crime or a reduced ca-
pacity to respond to calls for service have influenced the findings pre-
sented. Future scholarly inquiries in this area should focus on informing
these limitations as additional data become available.
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Fig. 4. Google mobility indices over time in Los
Angeles County and Marion County (Indianapolis).
Stay at home order date is indicated with green
vertical line. Park mobility index in Indianapolis
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Table 3
Coefficients and p-values of daily calls for service rate regressed against Google daily residential mobility index controlling for day of the week
Type City Intercept res. Mob. coef. p-val Δy†
Burglary Los Angeles 100.5896 −0.8875↓ <0.0001⁎ −19.2740
Burglary Indianapolis 18.8282 −0.131 0.1927 −2.3061
Robbery Los Angeles 38.1009 −0.068 0.433 −1.4759
Robbery Indianapolis 5.3363 0.0112 0.7278 0.1970
Assault-battery Los Angeles 193.5346 −0.3977↓ 0.0471 −8.6362
Assault-battery Indianapolis 10.3443 0.0089 0.8383 0.1563
Vehicle theft Los Angeles 25.3955 0.3005↑ 0.0009⁎ 6.5268
Vehicle theft Indianapolis 19.3494 0.0797 0.3906 1.4022
Domestic violence Los Angeles 116.5062 0.6239↑ 0.0002⁎ 13.5495
Domestic violence Indianapolis 88.5106 0.8643↑ <0.0001⁎ 15.2112
Vandalism Los Angeles 53.4743 −0.4069↓ 0.0001⁎ −8.8368
Vandalism Indianapolis 19.927 0.1657 0.3166 2.9156
Traffic stops Los Angeles 335.0749 −9.7213↓ <0.0001 −211.1285
Traffic stops Indianapolis 203.3891 −12.8343↓ <0.0001 −225.8672
† Expected call rate change computed by multiplying the estimated coefficient of residential mobility by the average residential mobility index post- shelter in
place minus the average pre- school closing.
⁎ Significant after conservative Bonferroni correction with critical value =α 0.0042.
Table 4
Coefficients and p-values of daily verified crime report rate regressed against
Google daily residential mobility index controlling for day of the week.
Type City Intercept res. Mob. coef. p-val Δy†
Burglary Los Angeles 32.2002 −0.2071↓ 0.0106 −4.4614
Burglary Indianapolis 9.0286 −0.0444↓ 0.4237 −0.7818
Robbery Los Angeles 23.0183 −0.1990↓ 0.0040⁎ −4.2866
Robbery Indianapolis 4.9948 0.0377 0.2481 0.6566
Agg. Assault Los Angeles 43.2014 −0.2787↓ 0.0025⁎ −6.0034
Agg. Assault Indianapolis 4.2007 0.1227↑ 0.0013⁎ 2.1518
Vehicle theft Los Angeles 43.6541 0.3172↑ 0.0045⁎ 6.8325
Vehicle theft Indianapolis 11.6931 0.0165 0.7923 0.2897
bottomrule
† Expected call rate change computed by multiplying the estimated coeffi-
cient of residential mobility by the average residential mobility index post-
shelter in place minus the average pre- school closing.
⁎ Significant after conservative Bonferroni correction with critical value
=α 0.00625.
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